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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j). This appeal was poured over to the Court of Appeals on February 2, 1994, 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the document entitled "Letter of 
Intent to Enter Employment Agreement" constituted a contract of employment between appellant 
EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc. ("EnviroPak") and appellee John Diston. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Buehner Block Co. v. U. W.C* Associates, 752 
P.2d 892 (Utah 1988); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 
1988). 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Frederick Ninow had apparent 
authority to hire Diston as an employee of EnviroPak. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 752 P.2d 884. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The only determinative statute in this matter is the statute of frauds. That provision 
provides in relevant part as follows: 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or 
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged 
with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one 
year from the making of the agreement... 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(1). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is an action by plaintiff/appellee John Diston ("Diston") 
alleging breach of an employment contract between Diston and defendant/appellant EnviroPak 
Medical Products, Inc. ("EnviroPak"). Diston asserted that a document titled "Letter of Intent to 
Enter Employment Agreement" ("letter of intent") constituted a binding contract and that 
EnviroPak had breached the contract by refusing to employ him in accordance with the terms of 
the letter of intent. EnviroPak denied that the letter of intent was a binding contract and further 
denied that Frederick Ninow, who signed the letter of intent had authority to do so on behalf of 
EnviroPak. Diston further claimed that defendant/appellant Surgical Technologies, Inc. 
("Surgical") was liable as the alter ego of EnviroPak. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: The complaint was filed on April 21, 
1992 and included claims for breach of contract, including a separate third-party beneficiary 
claim, intentional interference with economic relations and fraud. Appellants brought a motion 
for summary judgment on May 26, 1993 The trial court granted that motion as to the claims for 
third-party beneficiary rights and fraud. The remaining claims were tried on July 19 and 20, 
1993. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on November 16, 1993, and 
the judgment was entered on November 18, 1993. The trial court awarded Diston a judgment in 
the amount of $54,834.60 against both EnviroPak and Surgical. Appellants filed a notice of 
appeal on December 9, 1993. The appeal was poured over from the Supreme Court on February 
2, 1994. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
In 1991, plaintiff/appellee John Diston (Diston) was employed as the assistant director of 
peri-operative services at Holy Cross Hospital where he was paid a yearly salary of $40,000. 
(R. 00624, FF 5.) He did not receive the use of a car (or a car allowance), stock options or 
bonuses as part of his compensation. (R. 00624-25.) At the same time, Frederick P. Ninow 
(Ninow) was employed by a company called Professional Medical in the area of marketing. 
(R. 00734, FF 6.) During his employment with Professional Medical, Ninow began planning for 
Professional Medical's possible manufacture and marketing of a new product line, consisting of 
pre-packaged, reusable surgical gowns and equipment. (R. 00736-37, FF 7.) 
Ninow became acquainted with Diston as a result of Ninow's efforts to promote the new 
products. (R. 00734-35, 36, FF 8.) Ninow's efforts were aimed at having Professional Medical 
produce and market the new products. (R. 00737.) Diston arranged for the products to be tested 
at Holy Cross Hospital. (R. 00583.) As their relationship developed, Ninow suggested the 
possibility of Diston coming to work for Professional Medical, and Diston eventually met with 
another representative of Professional Medical, although employment discussions went no 
further. (R. 00739, 00626.) Professional Medical began marketing the products to Holy Cross 
Hospital but was unable to undertake large-scale production or marketing. (R. 00740-41.) 
Ninow and Diston began planning for the formation of a new company to market the 
products on a large scale. (R. 00741, FF 9.) Ninow, Diston and others participated in preparing 
a business plan for the new company. (R. 00742, FF 9-11.) The plan included a list of names 
and corresponding positions within the proposed company. (R. 00627, 00587-89, 0592-95.) 
Ninow and Diston met several times throughout the spring and fall of 1991 to discuss formation 
1
 Citations to the findings of fact are abbreviated FF, followed by the paragraph number. The findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are found at pages 00516 through 00527 of the record and are attached as appendix 2. 
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of the new company and Diston's involvement and eventual employment. (R. 00593.) All of 
this activity occurred prior to any contact with Surgical. (R. 00025-27.) 
Ninow was unable to arrange funding for his own company. In the summer of 1991, 
Ninow was introduced to the principals of Surgical. (R. 00745, FF 12.) After a period of 
negotiation, Ninow and Surgical agreed to form EnviroPak as a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Surgical for purposes of manufacturing and marketing the products. (R. 00845, 00671-72, 
FF 13.) EnviroPak was incorporated as a wholly owned subsidiary of Surgical, and an 
Organization Agreement for EnviroPak was prepared on September 19, 1991. (R. 00671, FF 13-
15.) Diston had no involvement in organizing EnviroPak. (R. 00627-28.) Diston had not even 
heard of Surgical until Ninow informed him in September of 1991 that Surgical was going to 
finance the new company. (R. 00597-98, 599.) In September of 1991, Diston's only source of 
information about Surgical and EnviroPak was Ninow. (R. 00598.) 
Ninow became employed with EnviroPak on October 1, 1991, as the president, a director, 
and chairman of the board of directors. During the period of the negotiations between Surgical 
and Ninow leading up to the formation of EnviroPak, there was no contact of any kind between 
Surgical and Diston. (R. 00627-28.) Diston's sole contact was with Ninow. (R. 00598.) No one 
at EnviroPak or Surgical was aware that Diston was expecting to be employed by EnviroPak 
(R. 00852, 00670), and no one was aware that Ninow had been discussing employment with 
Diston. (R. 00672-74,75.) 
On September 20, 1991, two weeks prior to his actual employment with EnviroPak, 
Ninow went to Diston's home where he met with Diston and Rochelle Mills-LaRocca, another 
employee of Holy Cross Hospital. (FF 25.) Ninow had also been discussing employment with 
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Ms. Mills-LaRocca. (Mills-LaRocca depo at 12.)2 Ninow gave Diston a document titled Letter 
of Intent to Enter Employment Agreement (letter of intent) (see appendix 3) and gave a virtually 
identical letter to Rochelle Mills-LaRocca. (R. 00803, 00762A, 00601, 00757; Mills-LaRocca 
depo. at 6-7, 10, 11; appendix 7.) 
Ninow did not consult with EnviroPak before giving the letter of intent to Diston. 
(R. 00758, FF 23.) Ninow also showed Diston parts of the EnviroPak organization agreement 
(R. 00602), as well as a copy of Ninow's own employment agreement. (R. 00760; Mills-
LaRocca depo. at 12, 14.) Ninow's employment agreement provided that he would become 
employed with EnviroPak as of October 1, 1991 (appendix 4). 
Mills-LaRocca met with Ninow and Diston on September 20, 1991, when Ninow brought 
both letters of intent. (Mills-LaRocca depo. at 10, FF 25.) Ninow's own employment agreement 
had not been executed (FF 19), and Ninow's employment did not commence until October 1, 
1991 (appendix 4.) Although Diston claimed that Ninow displayed the EnviroPak organization 
agreement at this meeting, Mills-LaRocca stated that she had never seen it. (Mills-LaRocca 
depo. at 31.) 
The letter of intent (appendix 3) states, among other things, that Diston and EnviroPak 
would enter into an employment agreement on or before October 31, 1991, and that Diston, as an 
incentive to enter into that agreement, would be provided with unspecified stock options. 
(R. 00759-60; appendix 3.) No one from EnviroPak had authorized Ninow to hire any 
employees for the new company despite several attempts by Ninow to do so. (R. 00846-50.) 
2
 The Mills-LaRocca deposition was received by the trial court in its entirety. (R. 00576.) The deposition was 
apparently misplaced and was not included as part of the record on appeal. Appellants have, therefore, attached as 
part of the appendix (#8) to this brief the portions of the deposition cited in this brief. 
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Diston expected that a formal, complete written agreement would be prepared. (R. 00634, 
FF 28.) 
The letter of intent provides in full as follows: 
THIS LETTER OF INTENT TO ENTER INTO AN EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT (this "Letter of intent") dated September 20, 1991, by and 
between ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS INC., a corporation organized 
and existing under the state of Utah (the "Company") and JOHN DISTON 
("Employee"). 
1. INTENT. The Company intends to enter into an employment 
agreement with Employee on or before October 31, 1991. 
2. Term. The initial term of the employment agreement shall be for 
three years. 
3. Compensation. 
(a) For all services rendered by Employee, the Company shall 
pay a salary of $72,000 per year payable as earned in twenty-four (24) 
equal semi-monthly payments. All salary shall be subject to withholdings 
and other applicable taxes. Such salary shall be reviewed annually and 
shall remain fixed or be increased to the extent deemed appropriate by the 
board of directors of the Company. 
(b) As an incentive compensation, Employee shall participate 
in the Company's cash incentive compensation pool. 
(c) The Company shall provide health and medical insurance 
to be chosen by the Company for its full time employees. 
(d) The Company shall provide Employee a monthly 
automobile allowance. 
(e) The Company shall provide Employee with stock options 
as incentive to enter into an Employment Agreement with the Company. 
The Company shall also provide Employee with future stock options as 
part of the Company incentive program. These options will be determined 
by the Company at the time of employment. 
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(f) The Company will pay for actual and reasonable expenses 
incurred by Employee in connection with the business of the company, 
including expenses for entertainment, travel and similar items. 
(g) The Employee shall be entitled each year to a paid vacation 
of at least two (2) weeks. 
Diston wanted to know what his job title and duties would be. (R 00604.) He was told 
by Ninow that he would be the vice-president in charge of quality control and production. 
(R. 00604.) Diston was also told that an employment agreement much like Ninow's would be 
prepared to reflect Diston's employment with EnviroPak. (R. 00760.) Diston believed he was 
being hired as a vice president of EnviroPak. (R. 00604.) Diston also believed he might be 
appointed to the EnviroPak board of directors. (R. 00640.) He acted with the understanding that 
EnviroPak was going to follow the business plan he and Ninow had prepared. (R. 00652.) 
Surgical organized an informational meeting on October 3, 1991 to explain and 
demonstrate the new product. (R. 00850, 00674A.) Diston attended the meeting at Ninow's 
invitation. (R. 00674A, 00611.) He was introduced first to Todd Crosland, an officer and 
director of EnviroPak, as an employee of Holy Cross Hospital where the new product was being 
used. (R. 00850.) Although he had already received the letter of intent, Diston said nothing to 
the Surgical or EnviroPak representatives about working for EnviroPak. (R. 00850, 00675.) At 
the meeting itself, Diston was introduced as a representative of Holy Cross, and he discussed the 
hospital's ongoing use of the products. (R. 00753, 00674A-75; Mills-LaRocca depo. at 20.) 
Ninow continued to mention Diston as a potential employee (R. 00675), but never mentioned the 
letter of intent to anyone. (R 00680.) Diston gave notice to Holy Cross Hospital on October 9, 
1991 that he would be leaving. (FF 31.) 
During the middle of October, Surgical held a series of meetings with stockbrokers to 
discuss the new products and the formation of EnviroPak. (R. 00851, 00678.) Diston was 
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invited to those meetings by Ninow. (R. 00679.) On each occasion, Diston was introduced as a 
representative of Holy Cross, a current product user. (R. 00851, 00679, 00637-38.) Diston never 
said anything to the EnviroPak representatives about employment. (R. 00851, 00679-80, 00635-
38.) After one of the meetings, Diston was asked by Rochelle Schutjer, an officer and director 
of EnviroPak, how Diston was able to attend these meetings and be away from Holy Cross. 
Diston replied only that he was taking vacation time. (R. 00880.) 
At Ninow's request, Mills-LaRocca met with Crosland and Schutjer during the middle of 
October to negotiate the terms of her employment. (Mills-LaRocca depo. at 21-22.) During the 
meeting she realized that Ninow did not have the authority to hire employees as he had claimed. 
{Id. at 17, 21.) She realized that the other principals of EnviroPak were not aware of her letter of 
intent and that her employment terms would not necessarily match what Ninow had put in the 
letter of intent. She did not even mention the letter during her interview. {Id. at 21, 23-26; R. 
00676.) All of the terms of her employment were negotiated during that meeting and, although 
her letter of intent provided otherwise, she did not receive stock options and was given only a 
one-year employment term. {Id. at 23; R. 00677'-78; cf. appendix 7.) 
Mills-LaRocca told Diston that same day that she had met with the principals of 
EnviroPak and that the terms of her employment differed from the letter of intent. {Id. at 25-26.) 
Diston did not discuss employment with the directors of EnviroPak during October 1991 - his 
sole contact continued to be Ninow. (R. 00643.) Diston assumed, but without consulting 
anyone, that he would be hired based on the letter of intent. (R. 00643.) 
During that same period of time, Ninow and the other principals of EnviroPak were 
discussing potential employment terms with Dick HoUingshead. (R. 00633). Diston was aware 
of these negotiations and that HoUingshead was unhappy about the terms being proposed. 
(R. 00632-33.) Although HoUingshead was listed in the business plan and was originally 
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intended to be part of the new company (R. 00632), he was not hired by EnviroPak. (R. 00633). 
Rochelle Mills was not listed in the plan, but she was hired. (R. 00677-78; appendix 6.) At the 
time Diston claims he told Ninow that he accepted the job according to the letter of intent, Diston 
had not had any conversations with anyone from EnviroPak. (R. 00637.) 
The principals of EnviroPak later learned that Ninow had been negotiating employment 
terms with Diston, as well as others, and that Ninow had been making other unauthorized 
representations and taking other unauthorized actions on behalf of EnviroPak. (R. 00846-50, 
00524.) As a result, Ninow was terminated from EnviroPak in December 1991. (R. 00683-84, 
00708, FF 38.) On October 31, 1991, EnviroPak learned of the letter of intent Ninow had given 
to Diston, and the officers contacted Diston to discuss the situation. (R. 00680-82.) Although 
the position Diston wanted did not exist (R. 00685, 00712), and Diston did not have the technical 
experience to manage the EnviroPak plant, (R. 00683), he was offered employment with 
EnviroPak primarily in the area of sales, at a salary of $60,000 per year, plus a company car. 
(R. 00615, 00682-85, 00324, FF 40.) 
He declined that offer, claiming that he was entitled to have a job title and to know what 
duties he was to perform. (R. 00614-16, 00645, FF 40-41.) It was explained to Diston that titles 
were not essential because the company was so new and that everyone would have to assist in 
getting the company started. (R. 00615, 00685.) Diston later accepted employment with FHP at 
$35,000 per year with no written contract. (R. 00615-16, 00618, 00625, 00646.) EnviroPak 
remained in business until December of 1992, but then ceased operations because it was losing 
money. (R. 00678, 00865-66, 00525, FF 43.) 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Diston brought this action on April 21, 1992, alleging breach of contract, intentional 
interference with economic relations (against Surgical), third party beneficiary rights under the 
EnviroPak Organization Agreement and fraud. (R. 00002-00015.) The trial court granted 
summary judgment to defendants-appellants as to the third party beneficiary and fraud claims. 
(R. 00380.) The remainder of the case was tried before the Honorable David E. Roth on July 19 
and 20, 1993. The court ruled in plaintiffs favor and awarded damages for breach of contract for 
the period during which Diston would have been employed with EnviroPak. After considering 
defendants' objections to plaintiffs proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court 
entered findings and conclusions on November 16, 1993, and entered judgment in favor of 
plaintiff on November 18, 1993, in the amount of $54,834.60, plus pre and post-judgment 
interest. (R. 531-32.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LETTER 
OF INTENT WAS A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN 
ENVIROPAK AND DISTON 
The letter of intent is not an employment contract. It lacks the two fundamental terms of 
an employment agreement: compensation and duties. Without these terms, which together 
constitute the mutuality of obligation required for any enforceable agreement, there was never 
anything more than a notion that a contract might be formed in the future. Diston himself 
admitted that he expected a written agreement that would include all of the terms of his 
employment. 
In addition, because the letter of intent purports to cover a three-year employment term, it 
is governed by the statute of frauds. As a result, it must be complete on its face as to all of its 
essential terms — in this case compensation and duties — before it rises to the level of an 
10 
enforceable contract. The letter fails that test. It is far too vague, leaving much for future 
negotiation, for the trial court to have concluded that there was a meeting of the minds of the 
parties. It is at best an agreement to agree, an offer to negotiate — or as its title suggests, a letter 
of intent to make a contract later. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT NINOW HAD 
APPARENT AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LETTER OF INTENT ON 
BEHALF OF ENVIROPAK 
Diston relied solely and unreasonably on Ninow in believing that he would be employed 
by EnviroPak. From the beginning, before he ever gave his termination notice to Holy Cross 
Hospital, Ninow's representations of authority were suspect. EnviroPak did nothing to support 
any kind of reliance on Ninow. Diston admits that his sole contact was Ninow. He was thus 
under a duty to ascertain Ninow's true authority. But Diston had more than a legal duty. He had 
many clear signals that EnviroPak had no intention of employing him, and definitely not 
according to the letter of intent. 
EnviroPak continually represented Diston as an employee of Holy Cross Hospital, a user 
of the new product. Diston never asked anyone about employment despite numerous 
opportunities to do so and numerous circumstances strongly suggesting that he should. The facts 
of this case throw into question just exactly what Diston was supposedly relying on. It is 
undisputed that Diston had no contact at all with EnviroPak prior to October 3, and his only 
contact after that point would have convinced anyone to at least inquire as to Ninow's authority. 
Instead, Diston did nothing. Because Diston did not ascertain Ninow's true authority, Ninow had 
no apparent authority to hire Diston. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LETTER 
OF INTENT WAS A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN 
ENVIROPAK AND DISTON 
"A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract is that there be a meeting of 
the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient 
definiteness to be enforced." Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1961). See also 
Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) ("a contract can be enforced by the courts only if 
the obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed.") 
Thus, when an essential term of an agreement remains subject to future negotiation, there is at 
best "a mere expression of a purpose to make a contract in the future . . . " Davison v. Robins, 
517 P.2d 1026, 1028-29 (Utah 1973). 
Mutual assent to the essential terms of a proposed agreement is required before a contract 
is formed. Engineering Associates v. Irving Place Assoc, 622 P.2d 784, 787 (Utah 1980). When 
a purported employment contract is in issue, it must, at the very least, contain terms reflecting the 
duties of, and compensation for, the proposed employment. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, 
CONTRACTS § 2-13, at 43, n.17. In Bishop v. Hendrickson, 695 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1985), the 
plaintiff brought an action against his law partner to enforce an oral agreement to employ his 
daughter at their law firm. Recognizing that the terms of an agreement must be "reasonably 
certain," the court held that a promise to employ someone that does not include the proposed 
position "and factors such as salary and terms of employment" is not enforceable as an 
employment agreement because it lacks certainty. Id. at 1314-15, citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1979).3 
3
 Section 33 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS provides, in full, as follows: 
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"An offer cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless there is sufficient 
specification of terms so that the obligations involved can be ascertained." K-Line Builders, Inc. 
v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 677 P.2d 1317, 1320 (Ariz. App. 1983), rew. denied. 
See also Page & Wirtz Construction Co. v. Van Doran Bri-Tico Co., 432 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App. 
1968); 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:14, at 307 (4th ed. 1992). This is just another way of 
describing the requirement of certainty — the first indicator that there has been a meeting of the 
minds. See Engineering Associates, 622 P.2d at 787; Valcarce, 362 P.2d at 428. 
Under certain circumstances, a contract term may be left for future determination (as 
opposed to negotiation) based on an agreed formula, such as for the price of goods, see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 33, comment a. An agreement governed by the 
statute of frauds is not permitted such latitude. To satisfy the statute of frauds, the agreement 
must be complete on its face as to all its essential terms. In order to comply with the statute of 
frauds, the writing on which a party relies must specify the obligation of the parties or it is 
unenforceable. Abba v. Smyth, 59 P.756, 757-58 (Utah 1899); Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 
242 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 1952); Machan Hampshire Properties v. Western Real Estate & Dev. 
Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah App. 1989).* 
(1) Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted 
so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain. 
(2) The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a 
breach and for giving an appropriate remedy. 
The fact that one or more terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain may show that a 
manifestation of intention is not intended to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance. 
4
 Accord, Nay v. Harrison, 299 P.2d 1114, 1118 (Utah 1956). (In order to satisfy the statute of frauds, the 
memorandum must identify the parties, the subject matter and "set out the conditions of the transaction with 
adequate certainty.") See also Collett v. Goodrich, 231 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1951) ("the memorandum must show 
what the contract was, and not merely note the fact that some contract was made"). 
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In Birdzell, plaintiff attempted to enforce an extension of a sublease based on oral 
discussions and a letter containing several terms, but which left the monthly rental open to future 
negotiations. 242 P.2d at 579. At issue was whether the letter was a sufficient memorandum 
under the statute of frauds, which governed inasmuch as the proposed sublease was for a period 
longer than one year. Id. at 580. "By its very language, the letter [purported] to be nothing more 
than an expression of willingness" to enter into an agreement. Id. Without the essential term of 
the monthly payment, the memorandum failed to satisfy the statute of frauds. 
When the statute of frauds applies, parol evidence may not be used to supply any 
essential terms of the agreement. Abba, 59 P. at 757-58. A court is not permitted to supply 
missing terms. Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). See also Barker 
v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987) (parties must agree on the essential elements for 
contract to be formed).5 
AM The Letter of Intent by Itself Demonstrates That Essential Terms Were 
Left For Future Negotiation and the Execution of a Formal Written 
Agreement 
The title of the letter of intent, "Letter of Intent to Enter Employment Agreement," is 
certainly indicative of what Ninow and Diston intended. Indeed, Ninow told Diston to expect 
"another document that would be exactly like mine or very similar to mine, with some changes, 
of course, reflecting [Diston's] arrangement. (R. 00760.) The most glaring omission from the 
letter of intent is any mention of job title and duties. These were essential to Diston. (R. 00614-
16,00645.) 
Further, the letter itself provides: 
5
 See also Neeley v. Bankers Trust Co. of Texas, 757 F.2d 621, 628 and n.5 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied (holding 
that when promises are indefinite and speak to an essential element of the contract, the entire purported agreement 
fails and observing that the court may not supply such terms) (quoting Willowwood Condominium Assoc, v. HNC 
Realty, 531 F.2d 1249, 1252 (5th Cir. 1976). 
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1. INTENT. [EnviroPak] intends to enter into an employment agreement with 
employee on or before October 31, 1991. 
(appendix 3) 
If EnviroPak were indeed intending to enter into an employment agreement more than 
two weeks after the date of the letter of intent, then it is impossible for the letter of intent itself to 
be that employment agreement. Moreover, the letter of intent appears to be intended to 
encourage Diston to negotiate further. With respect to proposed stock options, the letter provides 
as follows: 
The Company shall provide Employee with stock options as incentive to enter 
into an Employment Agreement with the Company. 
(Id) 
Importantly, the stock option provision appears as part of Distorts purported 
compensation. As an essential term of an employment agreement, compensation must be 
specifically set forth. However, the letter of intent provides that the stock options "will be 
determined by [EnviroPak] at the time of employment." Diston had never even seen the stock 
option plan under which he claimed a right to participation. (R. 00650-51.) Moreover, there 
could not possibly have been a meeting of the minds as to Diston's compensation based on such 
an open-ended term. 
Similarly, although the letter refers to additional compensation in the form of a cash 
incentive pool, there are no terms as to Diston's proposed rights in that incentive pool. By its 
very terms, therefore, like the letter in Birdzell, Diston's letter of intent is, at best, exactly what its 
title says, with many details left to negotiate. As such, it is nothing more than an expression of 
willingness and an invitation to negotiate.6 
6
 Such letters of intent are frequently exchanged as preliminary to an agreement and part of the negotiation dance. 
As such, they are "usually understood to be non-committal statements preliminary to a contract." CALAMARI & 
PERILLO at 33. Therefore, even though Ninow and Diston may have believed that they formed an agreement 
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Some of the alleged terms of employment, which in this case are critical because they 
were part of Diston's anticipated compensation, were so indefinite that the trial court was unable 
to award damages based on them. (R. 00472-73.) If, as the trial court found, the letter of intent 
is in reality an enforceable employment contract, then Diston's compensation must be clear 
because it is fundamental to an employment agreement. However, with respect to the stock 
options, the court concluded that "there are too many unknowns . . . to determine what, if any, 
value those options would have had to the plaintiff." (R. 00472.)7 
The same was true with respect to the cash incentive compensation pool mentioned in the 
letter of intent. There was simply no evidence as to the terms of plaintiffs participation. 
(R. 00473.) For the same reasons of indefiniteness, the court declined to award damages for the 
car allowance. (R. 00473.) With so many unknowns regarding Diston's compensation, to say 
nothing of the omission of any duties of employment, it was error for the court to conclude that 
an enforceable contract existed. 
B. The Letter of Intent is Not an Enforceable Agreement Because Diston 
Himself Expected That a Written Agreement was Forthcoming 
Diston fully understood that the letter of intent was only preliminary and that a complete 
written agreement would be prepared. He testified as follows: 
Q: Did you contemplate [at the time you received the letter of intent] that 
there would be a more detailed agreement entered into? 
A: Uh — yes. I felt with the provisions that were in our original agreement, 
yes. 
(R. 00761), the purported agreement must stand on its own from an objective theory rather than the long abandoned 
subjective theory of contracts. "If the content of the [proposed] agreement is unduly uncertain and indefinite no 
contract is formed " CALAMARI & PERILLO, at 43. 
7
 The court described the many missing terms in connection with the stock option. There was no agreement as to 
the number of shares, the price or the exercise period. (R. 00472.) 
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Q: And so you expected a written agreement at some point in the future? 
A: Yes. I felt that a little bit more formalized, yes. 
(R. 00634.) 
In addition, because Diston had no understanding as to his participation in the stock 
option program, including the exercise price and time limitations (R. 00628-32), as well as his 
rights, if any, under the cash incentive compensation pool (appendix 3; R. 00473), he could not 
possibly have believed reasonably that the letter of intent constituted his employment agreement. 
That is consistent with his testimony that he anticipated a subsequent agreement (R. 00634), and 
with the fact that Ninow told him an employment agreement just like Ninow's would be 
prepared. (R. 00760.) The differences between the letter of intent (appendix 3) and Ninow's 
agreement (appendix 4) are self-evident. Diston conceded, for example, that the circumstances 
under which he could be terminated would be included in his employment contract. (R. 00640.) 
Moreover, Diston believed strongly that he was entitled to a job title and description, 
detailing his duties so that, in his words, he would not be "cleaning toilets." (R. 00645, 00614.) 
Diston's instincts were accurate as an employee's duties are an essential element of an 
employment contract. CALAMARI & PERILLO at 43; Bishop, 695 P.2d at 1315. The letter of 
intent, of course, says nothing about Diston's title or duties. In fact, Diston later refused to accept 
a job offer from EnviroPak, even though that offer was still $20,000 more than what he had been 
receiving at Holy Cross Hospital and $25,000 more than he now receives at FHP, because he was 
not promised a particular title. (R. 00615-616, 00645.)8 
8
 Diston believed that he was free to create his own title and duties. Although he expected to be a director of 
operations under the business plan (R. 00639-40), at trial Diston actually referred to the letter of intent "to refresh 
[his] memory, just as to what role [he] was to play and what [his] job title was going to be." (R. 00604.) One 
wonders just what language in the letter of intent refreshed Diston's recollection that he would be the "vice 
president in charge of quality control and production." Id 
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C. The Letter of Intent is Not an Enforceable Contract Because it Fails to 
Satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
Any agreement, "that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making 
thereof must be in writing. UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(1). Moreover, M[i]t is fundamental that 
the memorandum which is relied upon to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all the 
essential terms and provisions of the contract. Birdzell, 242 P.2d at 580. See also Machan 
Hampshire Properties, 779 P.2d at 234. 
The letter of intent states that the proposed employment term is three years, thus bringing 
it within the statute of frauds. As a result, the letter must be complete in all its essential terms 
before it is enforceable. There are numerous deficiencies in the letter of intent. The very 
language of the letter of intent specifies several items of compensation that remain to be 
negotiated, and it utterly omits other terms customarily found in employment agreements such as 
termination provisions, remedies, vacation and sick leave. Most importantly, the letter of intent 
is silent with respect to Diston's proposed duties. This was an essential term to Diston. 
(R. 00614-16, 00645.) 
To satisfy the statute of frauds, the essential terms of such an agreement must be in 
writing. The letter of intent refers to compensation beyond a base salary in the form of stock 
options, cash incentives and a car allowance, but leaves them entirely open to negotiation. 
Without a description of Diston's duties, the letter is, at best, nothing more than an expression of 
willingness to negotiate. As such, it is not an enforceable contract. 
D. The Letter of Intent is, at Best, Only an Agreement to Agree in the 
Future and is Thus Unenforceable 
Agreements to agree are unenforceable. See, e.g., Wharf Restaurant, Inc. v. Port of 
Seattle, 605 P.2d 334 (Wash. App. 1979) (agreement to negotiate a contract in the future is 
nothing more than negotiation); Weil & Assoc, v. Urban Renewal Agency of Wichita, 479 P.2d 
18 
875, 883 (Kan. 1971). "The logic is that an agreement to agree on a particular term shows a lack 
of present agreement and also leaves the agreement indefinite." CALAMARI & PERILLO, at 51. 
An agreement providing that an essential term "was subject to the future mutual 
agreement of the parties . . . constituted a mere expression of a purpose to make a contract in the 
future, for the whole matter was contingent on further negotiations." Davison, 517 P.2d at 1028-
29. See also Engineering Associates, 622 P.2d at 787 (where the parties make it clear that they 
do not intend legal consequences until a formal writing is executed, there is no contract until that 
time).9 
By its very terms, the letter of intent states that the parties would enter into an 
employment agreement in the future. It contemplates expressly that certain terms were left to 
future negotiation and agreement. The two most essential terms of an employment agreement, 
namely compensation and duties, remain unspecified. While Diston's proposed yearly salary is 
specified, that is only part of the alleged compensation package. His purported stock options and 
cash incentive participation remain undefined, as does his automobile reimbursement. Moreover, 
Diston promises to do nothing under the letter of intent despite his concern with his titles and 
duties. (R. 00614-16, 00645, 00695.).10 
9
 See also Southland Corporation v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah App. 1988) (there is no agreement when it 
cannot be determined "whether the minds of the parties met upon all the essentials or upon what substantial terms 
they agreed. . . . " 
10
 Akin to this point is the underlying requirement of any contract that there be consideration on both sides. Under 
the terms of the letter of intent, there is no consideration on Diston's part because he has not committed himself to 
do anything in exchange for the yearly salary and other unspecified compensation. Sometimes referred to as 
mutuality of obligation, the requirement of consideration is inescapable and is lacking here. See Resource 
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985); Bess v. Jensen, 782 P.2d 542 
(Utah App. 1989). 
19 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT NINOW HAD 
APPARENT AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LETTER OF INTENT ON 
BEHALF OF ENVIROPAK 
M[A]n agent cannot make its principal responsible for the agent's actions unless the agent 
is acting pursuant to either actual or apparent authority." Zions First National Bank v. Clark 
Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah 1988).11 Apparent authority "flows only from the acts 
and conduct of the principal," and then only when a third party is aware of, and reasonably relies 
on, that conduct. Clark Clinic, 762 P.2d at 1095. In Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 
P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1983), the court observed that "apparent authority exists 'where a person has 
created such an appearance of things that it causes a third party reasonably and prudently to 
believe that a second party has the power to act on behalf of the first person . . .' " (quoting Winn 
v. McMahon Ford Co., 414 S.W.2d 330, 336 (Mo. App. 1967). 
In City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89 (Utah 1983), the 
Supreme Court stated as follows: 
It is well settled law that the apparent or ostensible authority of an agent can be 
inferred only from the acts and conduct of the principal. . . . Where corporate 
liability is sought for acts of its agent under apparent authority, liability is 
premised upon the corporation's knowledge of and acquiescence in the conduct of 
its agent which has led third parties to rely upon the agent's actions. . . . Nor is 
the authority of the agent "apparent" merely because it looks so to the person with 
whom he deals. It is the principal who must cause third parties to believe that the 
agent is clothed with apparent authority. . . . It follows that one who deals 
exclusively with an agent has the responsibility to ascertain that agent's authority 
despite the agent's representations. 
Id. at 90 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (citing Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation ofPres. 
ofCh, Etc., 534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975); Kiniski v. Archway Motel Inc., 586 P.2d 502 (Wash. 
1
 * There is no issue in this case as to any actual authority allowing Ninow to execute the letter of intent, or any 
other agreement for that matter, on behalf of EnviroPak. The court expressly found only apparent authority. 
(R. 00468.) For a discussion of the contours of actual authority, which will be found whenever there is express or 
implied authority, see Clark Clinic, 762 P.2d at 1094-95. 
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App. 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 43 (1980); Kuehn v. Kuehn, 642 P.2d 524 
(Colo. App. 1981), reh'g denied (1982); Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358 (Utah 1980); 
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982); Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 204, 
209 (Utah 1993). 
A. EnviroPak Did Nothing to Cause Diston to Believe Ninow Had 
Authority to Execute Contracts or Hire Employees on its Behalf, and 
EnviroPak Had No Knowledge of and Did Not Acquiesce In Ninow fs 
Conduct 
Ninow admitted that he did not discuss the letter of intent with anyone at EnviroPak and 
that he prepared it without any involvement by anyone at EnviroPak. (R. 00758.) Diston knew 
that Ninow had prepared the letter himself. Ninow's employment agreement and the 
Organization Agreement were prepared by EnviroPak's attorney. (R. 00642-642A, 00520.) 
Moreover, Diston admits to having had no contact whatsoever with anyone from EnviroPak until 
October 3, 1991, three weeks after he received the letter of intent from Ninow. (R. 00597-98, 99, 
00627-28.) 
Even then, EnviroPak did nothing to cause Diston to believe that Ninow had authority to 
do anything or to cause Diston to believe that Diston would be hired by EnviroPak. (R. 00753, 
00674A-75, 00680.) Indeed, even at the October 3, 1991 shareholders meeting and the 
subsequent meetings with stockbrokers (R. 00851), Diston was consistently introduced by 
EnviroPak representatives as a representative of Holy Cross Hospital, which was then the only 
user of the product. (R. 00753, 00674A-75, 00851, 00679, 00637-38; Mills-LaRocca depo. at 
20.) 
The organization agreement for EnviroPak was executed on September 19, 1991. 
(R. 00671.) Although the organization agreement does refer to an employment agreement with 
Ninow, that employment agreement, which Diston read, was not effective until October 1, 1991. 
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(R. 00760; appendix 4.) It was not even executed when Diston saw it. (FF 19.) It was not 
EnviroPak that showed these agreements to Diston. Ninow did that himself. (R 00602.) 
Either Ninow misrepresented when his employment with EnviroPak began, and there is 
no question that he was not yet employed when he prepared and delivered the letter of intent, or 
Diston failed to read Ninow's employment agreement. In either event, EnviroPak did nothing to 
cause Diston to believe that Ninow could hire Diston or otherwise bind EnviroPak to any 
agreement. Nor did EnviroPak do anything to cause Diston to believe he was going to be hired. 
Diston will undoubtedly point to EnviroPak's press release of September 19, 1991, 
announcing its formation and stating that Ninow would be an executive officer. (R. 00756.) 
However, there is no evidence of any kind even suggesting that Diston ever saw the press 
release. 
B. Diston Failed To Inquire Into Ninow's Authority Despite His Obligation 
To Do So 
Reasonable reliance is an essential element of apparent authority. Clark Clinic, 762 P.2d 
at 1095; Walker Bank & Trust, 672 P.2d at 75. "The 'apparent' aspect of apparent authority 
requires observation of irregularities as well as indicia of authority. Where such irregularities 
cast reasonable doubt and suspicion as to the apparent authority of a fiduciary, there comes into 
being a duty of inquiry as to his authority." Bridgeport Fireman's Sick and Death Benefit Assoc. 
v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 633 F.Supp. 516, 522 (D. Utah 1986). Once the duty 
to inquire arises, and it always does when one deals exclusively with a purported agent, 
Bradshaw, 649 P.2d at 78, it is not reasonable for the person to rely on agent's conduct or 
statements. Deseret Federal, 633 F.Supp. at 522. See also Walker Bank & Trust, 672 P.2d at 74. 
In other words, any reliance must be reasonable and prudent under the circumstances before 
apparent authority can exist. Id. 
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In J&JFood Centers v. Selig, 456 P.2d 691 (Wash. 1969), relied on in Deseret Federal, 
the court stated as follows: 
Facts and circumstances are sufficient to establish apparent authority only when a 
person exercising ordinary prudence, acting in good faith and conversant with 
business practices and customs, would be misled thereby, and such person has 
given due regard to such other circumstances as would cause a person of ordinary 
prudence to make further inquiry. 
456 P.2d at 694, quoted in Deseret Federal 633 F.Supp. at 522. 
In Deseret Federal, the court concluded that certain irregularities in a transaction were 
sufficient to raise a duty of further inquiry and, failing such inquiry, reliance on the agent's 
representations was unreasonable. 633 F.Supp. at 522. A bank had released funds, despite an 
irregularity on the face of a document indicating that the person withdrawing the funds may not 
have had authority to do so. Specifically, a signature that indicated apparent authority actually 
belonged to a past corporate officer no longer capable of signing for the corporation. Id. at 520. 
Based on a second letter showing that the officer had already been removed, the bank "was on 
notice" that the signature could not bind plaintiff and thus could not confer apparent authority. 
Id See also Luddington, 855 P.2d at 209-10. 
Because Diston admits to having dealt exclusively with Ninow (R. 00598, 00643), he was 
obligated to ascertain Ninow's authority "despite [Ninow's] representations" that he had 
authority. Bradshaw, 649 P.2d at 78. This he did not do. At best, Diston may have asked 
Ninow about Ninow's authority (R. 00602.) That inquiry is insufficient, for a purported agent 
cannot establish his or her own authority. Id. Diston's obligation was to inquire of EnviroPak. 
Id.12 Where Diston's contact was limited exclusively to Ninow, there was never even an 
12
 Diston claims that, because he was dealing with the president and chairman of the board, he did not need to 
inquire further. (R. 00643.) Diston could not, of course, have actually believed that because Ninow's own 
employment did not begin until October 1, 1991-two weeks after Diston received the letter of intent, (appendix 4.) 
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opportunity for EnviroPak to create the impression vis-a-vis Diston that Ninow was authorized to 
hire employees. 
Even after he learned that the letter of intent was not the basis for employment at 
EnviroPak and that Mills-LaRocca had negotiated her employment with the board of directors 
(Mills-LaRocca depo. at 25-26), Diston did nothing. He knew that Mills-LaRocca, who had an 
identical letter of intent from Ninow, had to meet with the entire board before her employment 
terms were established. (R. 00643.) Diston also knew that an employment contract still had to 
be prepared. (R. 00760, 00634.)13 
Diston was also aware of EnviroPak's negotiations with Dick Hollingshead, who Diston 
knew was included in the business plan as the proposed president. (R. 00632-33; appendix 6.) 
In September of 1991, Diston knew that Hollingshead had been negotiating with EnviroPak (not 
just Ninow) regarding his employment and was never hired. (R. 00632-33.) Diston believed that 
Surgical was involved in these negotiations and believed that Surgical was "adamant" that 
Ninow be president of EnviroPak. (R. 00633.) Despite these facts, Diston "assumed" without 
ever asking that he would be employed based solely on the letter of intent. (R. 00643.) 
Diston first met with representatives from EnviroPak on October 3, 1991 at a 
shareholder's meeting. (R. 00850.) That meeting occurred six days before Diston tendered his 
resignation at Holy Cross Hospital. (R. 00636.) Despite the opportunity to do so, Diston said 
nothing about employment, instead relying entirely on Ninow's representations. Diston again 
met with representatives of EnviroPak in mid-October, immediately after he tendered his 
13
 Diston testified rather unconvincingly that he thought Mills-LaRocca's meeting with the members of the 
EnviroPak board of directors "was merely a courtesy." (R. 00643.) He could not reasonably have believed that, 
having seen that Hollingshead had been in similar negotiations (R. 00632-33) and learning from Mills-LaRocca 
herself that those very same directors had negotiated terms of employment that differed from the letter of intent. 
(Mills-LaRocca depo. at 25-26.) 
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resignation (R. 00851, 00678), and still said nothing about employment. (R. 00680, 00675.) At 
all of these meetings, Diston was introduced strictly as a Holy Cross Hospital representative, and 
nothing was said concerning employment. (R. 00753, 00674A-75, 00851, 00679, 00637-38; 
Mills-LaRocca depo. at 20.) 
This failure to make inquiry is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that Diston was 
leaving a job he had held for fourteen years and was about to embark on an entirely new venture 
at twice his former salary, plus stock options in a company about which he knew nothing. 
(R. 00597-99.) Indeed, Diston believed he was a "key employee," that he was going to be the 
next vice president of EnviroPak with a right to share in the profits, and even possibly a member 
of the board of directors. (R. 00603-04, 00640, 00645.) 
"The duty of inquiry may be easily discharged by making simple inquiry directly with the 
principal. If this had been done in the case at bar, the problem here presented would have been 
avoided." 633 F.Supp at 522. What was true in Deseret Federal is also true here. Had Diston 
asked even once during the many opportunities he had, he would have learned that Ninow had no 
authority to bind EnviroPak to an employment agreement and that EnviroPak had no intention of 
hiring him under what terms there are in the letter of intent. 
Instead, Diston did nothing, despite clear signals that he could not rely on Ninow. In fact, 
all indications were that EnviroPak thought of Diston only as a Holy Cross Hospital 
representative and that EnviroPak knew nothing at all of the letter of intent. (R. 00637-38, 
00679; Mills-LaRocca depo. at 20, 25-26.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The letter of intent is exactly what it purports to be and nothing more. It fails as an 
enforceable contract because it is merely an agreement to agree and because it does not satisfy 
the statute of frauds. 
Ninow did not have apparent authority to hire employees for EnviroPak. Diston concedes 
that his sole contact, before and after EnviroPak was formed, was Ninow. EnviroPak did nothing 
to cause Diston to believe that Ninow was authorized to negotiate employment agreements 
entirely on his own ~ without the involvement of the rest of the board. All indications were to 
the contrary. Mills-LaRocca's meeting with the board that resulted in terms different from the 
letter of intent and the failed HoUingshead negotiations, coupled with the fact that EnviroPak 
continually represented Diston as an employee of Holy Cross Hospital, render Distonfs "reliance" 
on Ninow's authority completely unreasonable. Diston failed to discharge his duty to inquire 
about Ninow's authority and thus had no right to rely on Ninow's representations. 
This Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court for any or all of the above 
reasons and enter a judgment of no cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED this CH^day of March, 1994. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
ELLEN M A Y C O C K / 
DAVID C. WRIGHT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of March, 1994,1 mailed true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellants, via the U. S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Neil R. Sabin 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
Nielsen & Senior, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple Street 




Neil R. Sabin (2840) 
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-1900 
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Third Judicial District 
NOV 1 6 19! 
Qtputy Cleric 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 




ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, 
INC.f a Utah corporation, and 
SURGICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 
formerly PINNACLE 




Civil No. 920902269CN 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
This matter came on regularly for trial on July 19 and July 
20, 1993, before the Honorable David Roth, Judge presiding, and 
the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendants, 
jointly and severally, for: 
1. The sum of $54,834.60; plus 
EXHIBIT A 
2. $7,329.48 , representing pre-judgment interest from the 
date each payment was respectively due to September 1, 1993, 
with pre-judgment interest at $15.24 per day until entry of 
the Judgment herein; plus 
3. Interest from and after date of judgment at the legal 
rate until paid. >-^>^ S 
DATED this /<? day of X ^ ^ " , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 26 day of " D ^ ^ ^ M ^ / 
1993, I served upon the following a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing JUDGMENTf by causing the same to be mailed, postage 
pre-paidf to the following: 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
KRUSEf LANDA & MAYCOCK 
50 West 300 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Ut^h<78410; 
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Neil R. Sabin (2840) 
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-1900 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 




ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
SURGICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 
formerly PINNACLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 920902269CN 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
This matter came on regularly for trial on July 19 and July 
20, 1993, before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable David 
Roth, Judge, presiding and hearing all evidence. Plaintiff 
appeared in person by and through his attorney, Neil R. Sabin. 
The Defendants appeared through their representatives and their 
attorney, Ellen Maycock. The Court, having reviewed the 
pleadings and documents on file herein, having heard testimony 
and observed and considered the respective credibility and the 
testimony of the witnesses, having heard arguments and reviewed 
EXHIBIT ft 
memoranda and documentation submitted by the parties, and being 
fully advised in the premises now makes and enters its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff, John Diston ("Mr. Diston") is an individual 
and resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc. 
("EnviroPak"), was incorporated as a Utah corporation and at all 
times relevant herein had its principal place of business in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
3. Defendant Surgical Technologies, Inc. ("Surgical"), is 
a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business in 
Salt Lake County, Utah. Surgical was formerly known as Pinnacle 
Environmental, Inc. The name of that corporation was changed to 
its current name April 15, 1992. At all relevant times, Pinnacle 
was qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Utah. 
4. Surgical is a public company, having various 
subsidiaries. 
5. Mr. Diston was employed at Holy Cross Hospital in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, from 1977 until October 31, 1991. As of the 
termination of this employment, his title was Assistant Director 
of Peri-Operative Services. 
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6. During late 1990 and early 1991, Frederick P. Ninow 
("Mr. Ninow") was associated with a company called Professional 
Medical. 
7. While associated with Professional Medical, Mr. Ninow 
undertook planning and efforts anticipating Professional 
Medical's possible manufacture and marketing of pre-packaged 
supply packets featuring principal components that are laundered, 
sterilized and pre-packed for repeated use in surgical and other 
health care procedures (the "Product"). 
8. Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston became acquainted while Mr. 
Ninow was investigating the anticipated Product and the nature of 
a possible market for that Product. 
9. When Professional Medical was unwilling or unable to 
attempt to market the Product on a large scale, Mr. Ninow decided 
to leave Professional Medical, to form his own company and to 
raise money for marketing the Product. 
10. During this time, Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston began 
discussing their respective roles with that new company, with the 
understanding that Mr. Diston was to be a member of that new 
company and to serve as Director/Operations. Preliminary 
discussions were also made with other persons for future 
involvement with the new company. 
11. During that time, Mr. Ninow, with some input from Mr. 
Diston and others, wrote a rough and general business plan 
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regarding the proposed company financing, operation and marketing 
of the Product. 
12. Mr. Ninow was acquainted with a son of Rex Crosland, 
chairman of Surgical. As a result of discussions between those 
persons, Mr. Ninow became introduced to principals of Surgical, 
including Rex Crosland, Todd Crosland and Rockwell Schutjer in 
the Summer of 1991, several months after his association began 
with Mr. Diston. 
13. Pursuant to the discussions between Mr. Ninow and the 
Surgical representatives, those parties agreed to establish 
EnviroPak, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Surgical, for 
marketing of the Product. 
14. Surgical caused Surgical's counsel to prepare the 
Articles of Incorporation for EnviroPak, an Organization 
Agreement among Surgical, EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow, and an 
Employment Agreement between EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow. 
15. Mr. Ninow, EnviroPak and Surgical, as the sole 
shareholder of EnviroPak, executed the Organization Agreement, 
dated September 19, 1991. 
16. The Organization Agreement provided, among other 
things, that: EnviroPak was a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Surgical; that Mr. Ninow would be director, chairman of the board 
and president of EnviroPak; that EnviroPak would enter into an 
Executive Employment Agreement with Mr. Ninow contemporaneously 
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with the execution of the Organization Agreement; that Mr. Ninow 
assigned to EnviroPak his business plan; that Surgical could 
designate two directors of EnviroPak; that Mr. Ninow could also 
choose another director of EnviroPak; and that EnviroPak would 
have considerable autonomy of operation. 
17. Todd Crosland and Rockwell Schutjer served as directors 
of EnviroPak as designated by Surgical. 
18. The Organization Agreement was silent on the issue of 
whether Mr. Ninow had the authority to hire employees for 
EnviroPak and to make a commitment for any particular salary. 
19. The parties executed an Executive Employment Agreement, 
between EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow, also prepared by EnviroPak's 
counsel. This was subsequently executed. 
20. The Executive Employment Agreement provided that Mr. 
Ninow was employed by EnviroPak as president, as director, as 
chairman of the board of directors, and as chief operating 
officer "with all of the rights, powers and obligations normally 
associated with such position." 
21. On September 19, 1991, the same date as the 
Organization Agreement, Surgical prepared and caused release of a 
news release regarding the formation of EnviroPak and, in that 
release, referred to Mr. Ninow as "EnviroPak President and CEO." 
22. Throughout his discussions with Surgical, Mr. Ninow 
advised Mr. Diston as to the nature of Mr. Ninow's discussions 
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with Surgical, since both individuals expected Mr. Diston to be 
part of the company marketing the Product. 
23. There was no evidence that Rockwell Schutjer or Todd 
Crosland knew Mr. Ninow had offered employment to Mr. Diston 
until after execution of the letter of intent between EnviroPak 
and Mr. Diston. 
24. Because of Mr. Ninow's specific responsibilities with 
EnviroPak, pursuant to the Organization Agreement and the 
Executive Employment Agreement, Mr. Ninow believed that he had 
the authority to enter into an employment arrangement with Mr. 
Diston. 
25. Mr. Ninow delivered the letter of intent to Mr. Diston 
and, also, delivered a letter of intent to Rochelle Mills-LaRocco 
on or about September 20, 1991. 
26. Pursuant to Mr. Diston's and Mr. Ninow's discussions, 
on September 20, 1991, Mr. Ninow, signing as the "duly authorized 
officer" of EnviroPak, executed a Letter of Intent to Enter 
Employment Agreement (the "Employment Agreement") with Mr. Diston 
as the employee. 
27. The Employment Agreement provided that Mr. Diston would 
be employed for three years commencing on or before October 31, 
1991; would receive a salary of $72,000 per year, payable bi-
weekly; would receive a monthly automobile allowance; would 
participate in the company's stock option program; would receive 
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health and accident insurance; would be reimbursed for business 
expenses; would participate in the incentive compensation 
program; and would receive two weeks paid vacation. 
28. Mr. Diston and Mr. Ninow both contemplated that Mr. 
Diston would enter into a formal, complete employment agreement, 
consistent with the Letter of Intent, at a later time. 
29. After preparation of the Employment Agreement, Mr. 
Ninow and Mr. Diston orally agreed to a $360.00 per month 
automobile allowance for Mr. Diston. 
30. Mr. Diston informed Mr. Ninow that he accepted that 
agreement and that he intended to give notice to terminate his 
employment at Holy Cross Hospital. 
31. On or about October 9, 1991, Mr. Diston, in reliance on 
the Employment Agreement, notified Holy Cross Hospital of his 
intent to terminate his employment effective October 31, 1991. 
32. Both Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston considered the Employment 
Agreement fully binding upon Mr. Diston and EnviroPak. 
33. Because of the acts of EnviroPak and Pinnacle in 
drafting the Organization Agreement, Employment Agreement and 
issuing the press release, Mr. Ninow believed he had the 
authority to execute the Letter of Intent. Under the 
circumstances of this case, it was reasonable for Mr. Diston to 
rely on Mr. Ninow's authority. 
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34. Mr. Diston's reliance on the Letter of Intent and 
giving notice to Holy Cross Hospital of his termination were 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
35. After giving notice of termination to Holy Cross 
Hospital, Mr. Diston became aware of problems between Mr. Ninow 
and Surgical. Mr. Diston was, for the first time, informed of 
problems affecting the job. 
36. Mr. Diston asked Holy Cross Hospital whether he could 
receive his job back. He was told, however, that Holy Cross 
Hospital had made arrangements and commitments with other 
personnel and, accordingly, it was not possible to get the job 
back. 
37. Surgical, as the sole shareholder of EnviroPak failed 
to observe the separate corporation structure format and 
operation of EnviroPak which included at least the following: 
a. Under paragraph 3 of the Employment Agreement, Mr. 
Ninow served at the pleasure of the board of either Surgical 
or EnviroPak, suggesting that Surgical retained significant 
control over EnviroPak. 
b. Surgical was the sole entity and source of the 
funding of the business and anticipated business of 
EnviroPak. 
c. EnviroPak was capitalized with only $1,000 
capital, which was grossly undercapitalized for the 
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anticipated business of this type and illusory or trifling 
compared with the business to be done and the risk of loss. 
d. The corporate formalities were not observed 
between Surgical and EnviroPak. The failure to maintain the 
corporate formalities and separateness reasonably and likely 
created the potential of inequitable results leaving 
EnviroPak totally dependent upon Surgical. 
38. Disputes arose between persons who were representatives 
of Surgical and EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow. Pursuant to these 
disputes, Mr. Ninow, before December 10, 1991, was terminated 
for, among other things, failing to consult with the board of 
directors of EnviroPak on important decisions, including whether 
to hire employees. 
39. Given the nature of the disputes and the actions of Mr. 
Ninow, it is not unreasonable to determine that Mr. Ninow should 
have been fired in this case. 
40. Mr. Diston subsequently met with Todd B. Crosland and 
Rockwell P. Schutjer. During discussions, these Surgical and 
EnviroPak representatives offered Mr. Diston employment with 
EnviroPak for $60,000, but without the other benefits which Mr. 
Diston believed he was entitled to under the Employment 
Agreement. Moreover, they refused to provide any specificity of 
the job or any written agreement. 
41. As a result, Mr. Diston refused the above job offer. 
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42. Mr. Diston, having measured the risks of a three year 
contract which was not honored, together with the risks of a 
contract offered by Pinnacle without a time period and as an 
employee at will contract, was reasonable in rejecting the offer. 
43. EnviroPak ceased business operations effective December 
31, 1992. 
44. Insufficient evidence exists for the court to determine 
that Pinnacle purposely, or negligently, was responsible for the 
failure of the business of EnviroPak. 
45. Mr. Diston was unemployed from October 31, 1991, until 
February 24, 1992, at which time he became employed with FHP 
Health Care where he continues to be employed. 
46. From February 24, 1992, until December 31 1992, Mr. 
Diston earned $29,165.40 as gross income. 
47. The difference between what Mr. Diston earned from 
October 31, 1991, through December 31, 1992, and what Mr. Diston 
was to be paid under the Employment Agreement was $54,834.60. 
48. Mr. Diston reasonably could not be expected to be 
entitled to damages beyond the date of December 31, 1992, because 
the business ceased to exist and the parties understood at the 
time of entry of their agreement that it was a risky undertaking. 
49. Insufficient evidence exists with respect to the terms 
and calculations of any damages for failure of stock options and 
for incentive bonuses. 
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50. With respect to the monthly car allowance, no evidence 
is before the Court as to what percentage of time or use the Mr. 
Diston was required to use the car in connection with his 
Employment with EnviroPak. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Mr. Ninow had the apparent authority to enter into the 
Employment Agreement with Mr. Diston. 
2. Mr. Diston reasonably relied upon Mr. Ninow's apparent 
authority to enter into the Employment Agreement. 
3. Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston agreed on the essential 
provisions of the Letter of Intent to the extent that it provided 
for an offer of employment of a term of years and for a specific 
salary and, hence, there existed a valid agreement between 
EnviroPak and Mr. Diston. 
4. Because of the understandings and agreements contained 
in the Letter of Intent, and the reliance of Mr. Diston on the 
contract, the statute of frauds does not apply; and the 
Employment Agreement constitutes an enforceable agreement. 
5. Mr. Diston was ready and willing to perform under the 
Employment Agreement and was not in breach thereof. 
6. EnviroPak breached the Employment Agreement with Mr. 
Diston and refused to perform thereunder. 
7. Because there existed such a unity of interest between 
Surgical and EnviroPak and the failure to observe separate 
24730.DI783.1 -11-
corporate form, such arrangements sanctioned the possibility of 
fraud or otherwise promoted injustice; EnviroPak was a hollow 
shell and not a viable entity; and EnviroPak was an alter ego of 
Surgical. 
8. As a result, the breach of contract by EnviroPak also 
constituted a breach of contract by Surgical. 
9. There does not exist sufficient evidence for a claim of 
tortious interference of economic benefits against Surgical. 
10. Mr. Diston is entitled to damages for breach of 
contract in the amount of $54,834.60, representing the difference 
that Plaintiff earned from October 31, 1991, through December 31, 
1992, and the amounts that he would have been entitled to earn 
under the contract with EnviroPak, together with interest at the 
pre-judgment rate for each deficient amount of compensation 
payment from that date the payment was due. 
11. Plaintiff is not entitled to any payments since 
December 31, 1992, because EnviroPak's business was terminated 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
a/ 
I hereby certify that on this ~^ day of September, 1993, 
I served upon the following a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, by causing the 
same to be mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
50 West 300 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8j 
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Tab 3 
LETTER OF INTENT 
TO ENTER EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS LETTER OF INTENT TO ENTER INTO AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
(this "Letter of intent") dated September 20, 1991, by and between 
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS INC, a corporation organized and 
existing under the state of Utah (the "Company") and JOHN DISTON 
("Employee") . 
1. INTENT. The Company intends to enter into an employment 
agreement with Employee on or before October 31, 1991. 
2. Term. The initial term of the employment agreement shall 
be for three years. 
3. Compensation. 
(a) For all services rendered by Employee, the Company 
shall pay a salary of $72,000 per year payable as earned in 
twenty-four (24) equal semi-monthly payments. All salary 
shall be subject to withholdings and other applicable taxes. 
Such salary shall be reviewed annually and shall remain fixed 
or be increased to the extent deemed appropriate by the board 
of directors of the Company. 
(b) As an incentive compensation, Employee shall 
participate in the Company,s cash incentive compensation pool. 
(c) The Company shall provide health and medical 
insurance to be chosen by the Company for its full time 
employees. 
(d) The Company shall provide Employee a monthly 
automobile allowance. 
(e) The Company shall provide Employee with stock 
options as incentive to enter into an Employment Agreement 
with the Company. The Company shall also provide Employee with 
future stock options as part of the Company incentive program. 
These options will be determined by the company at the time of 
employment. 
(f) The Company will pay for actual and reasonable 
expenses incurred by Employee in connection with the business 
of the company, including expenses for entertainment, travel 
and similar items. 
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(g) The Employee shall be entitled each year to a paid 
vacation of at least two (2) weeks. 
LETTER OF INTENT as of the date first above written. 
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC. 
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Tab 4 
EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this -Agreement") is entered into 
effective October 1, 1991, by and between ENV1RO PAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC., a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the state of Utah (the "Company"), and FREDERICK 
NINOW ("Executive"). 
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual covenants contained herein and of the mutual 
benefits to the parties to be derived therefrom, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Employment. The Company hereby employs Executive to perform those duties generally 
described in this Agreement, and Executive hereby accepts and agrees to such employment on the 
terms and conditions set forth. 
2. Term. The initial term of this Agreement shall be for a period of Ave years commencing 
on the date of this Agreement, unless earlier terminated in the manner provided herein. If not 
terminated in writing by the Company or Executive, this Agreement shall continue in effect on a 
month-to-month basis subsequent to expiration of the initial term. Executive understands and 
acknowledges that this Agreement may be terminated by the Company during the initial term in 
accordance with the express provisions of this Agreement and may be terminated at any time 
subsequent to the initial term, by either the Company or the Executive on 15 days' written notice to 
the other. 
3. Duties. During the term of this Agreement, Executive shall be employed by the 
Company, subject to change by the board of directors, as the chief operating executive of the Company 
and shall have all of the rights, powers, and obligations normally associated with such position. 
Executive agrees to serve, at the pleasure of the board of directors of the Company or any parent of the 
Company, as president, director, and chairman of the board of directors of the Company and in such 
additional and/or other offices or positions with the Company or any parent or subsidiary of the 
Company as shall, from time to time, be determined by such board of directors, without compensation 
other than as set forth herein. Executive shall devote his full working time, attention, and energy to 
the business of the Company or its parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates and shall not during the term of 
this Agreement be engaged in any other business activities which will significantly interfere or 
conflict with the reasonable performance of his duties hereunder. 
4. Best Efforts. Executive agrees that he will faithfully, industriously, and to the best of his 
ability, experience, and talents, perform his duties under the terms of this Agreement and will seek to 
promote and develop the business of the Company. 
5. Compensation 
(a) For all services rendered by Executive, the Company shall pay to Executive a 
salary of $100,000 per year, payable as earned in 24 equal semi-monthly payments. All salary 
payments shall be subject to withholding and other applicable taxes. Such salary shall be 
reviewed annually and shall remain fixed or be increased to the extent deemed appropriate by 
the board of directors of the Company. 
(b) As incentive compensation, Executive shall participate in the Company's cash 
incentive compensation pool from which the Company allocates and pays to its key executives 
cash incentive compensation based on the Company's pretax profits as a percentage of revenues, 
as follows: 
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Percent of Pre-Tax 
Pre-Tax Profits as a Profits Allocated 
Percentage of Gross Revenues to Compensation Pool 
i 5%, but less than 20% 1% 
20%, but less than 25% 2% 
25%, but less than 30% 3% 
30%, but less than 35% 4% 
35% or more 5% 
Revenues shall include all revenues from the sale of products or services by the Company, net of 
returns and adjustments, and including extraordinary items. Pre-tax profits shall include all profits 
from whatever source, including extraordinary items, prior to payment of or allowance for income 
taxes. Such incentive compensation shall be determined and paid annually, in any event within 
110 days after the end of the fiscal year. To the extent practicable, prior to the end of the fiscal year 
the Company shall review its estimated earnings and profits for the year, shall estimate the amount 
allocable to such incentive compensation pool, shall allocate such pool among the various members of 
the executive management team, and shall pay such estimated amounts, with final adjustments and 
reconciliations to be made within 110 days after the end of such year. By way of example, if in a given 
fiscal year the Company had gross revenues of $10,000,000 that result in pre-tax profits of $2,300,000, 
which is 23% of such revenues, then 2% of such $2,300,000 of pre-tax profits, or $46,000, would be 
allocated to such incentive compensation pool. 
6. Working Facilities. The Company shall provide Executive with such reasonable working 
facilities and services, including an office and secretarial assistance, as are necessary and appropriate 
for the performance of his duties. Such facilities and services shall be provided to Executive at the 
Company's principal place of business or such other place as may be reasonably determined by the 
board of directors of the Company. 
7. Employment Benefits. The Company shall provide health and medical insurance for 
Executive in a form and program to be chosen by the Company for its full-time employees. Executive 
shall be entitled to participate in any retirement, pension, profit-sharing, stock option, or other plan as 
now in effect or hereafter adopted by the Company on the same basis as other employees. 
8* Vacations. Executive shall be entitled each year to a paid vacation of at least three 
weeks. Vacation shall be taken by Executive at a time and with starting and ending dates mutually 
convenient to the Company and Executive. Vacation or portions of vacations not used in one 
employment year shall carry over to the next succeeding employment year, but shall thereafter expire 
if not used within such succeeding year. 
9- Expenses. The Company will reimburse Executive for actual and reasonable expenses 
incurred by Executive in connection with the business of the Company, including expenses for 
entertainment, travel, attendance at conventions, employee training, and similar items, on 
Executive's periodic presentation of an itemized account of such expenses, together with supporting 
documentation. 
10. Ownership of Discoveries. Executive agrees to fully and completely disclose any and all 
present and future inventions, improvements, discoveries, techniques, or products (the "Discoveries") 
related to the business or proposed business of the Company resulting from Executive's activities 
during the term of this Agreement, whether such activities are performed on or off the premises of the 
Company. All such Discoveries shall be the sole and exclusive property of the Company. Executive 
agrees to provide all information and data concerning such Discoveries in his possession or control to 
the Company and to lend reasonable assistance to the Company concerning the use and application of 
such Discoveries and shall execute and deliver all such documents and take all such other actions as 
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are reasonably necessary to vest all right, title, and interest in such Discoveries, including patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks with respect thereto, in the Company. 
11. Covenant Not to Compete During Term of Agreement. During the initial term of this 
Agreement and any extension subsequent to the expiration of the initial term, Executive agrees not to 
engage, directly or indirectly, in any business or activity, whether as an employee, equity proprietor, 
or partner, of any corporation or association that competes in any geographic market with the 
Company or its parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it shall not be a 
breach of the provisions of this paragraph for Executive to purchase equity securities in the ordinary 
course of his investments if Executive's sole affiliation with such business or association is the 
ownership of 5% or less of the equity of any such business or association. 
12. Covenant Not to Compete Subsequent to Term of Agreement. Executive acknowledges 
that he will acquire and develop certain methods, skills, and expertise in the operation and conduct of 
the business of the Company during the course of his employment with the Company. Executive 
agrees that for a period of one year subsequent to the expiration or earlier termination of the initial 
term of this Agreement or any extension of that initial term, he will not, directly or indirectly, provide 
services similar to those services to any business, corporation, or other entity that: 
(a) Provides services or products similar to or competitive with the services or 
products provided by the Company to past, present, or prospective customers of the Company; 
(b) Competes with the services or products provided by the Company in any 
geographic market; or 
(c) Is undertaking entry into a geographic market that is similar to or competitive 
with the markets of the Company. 
The covenants contained in this paragraph shall be construed as a series of separate covenants, one for 
each state in the United States of America and one for each country outside the United States of 
America. Except for geographical coverage, each separate covenant shall be deemed identical in its 
terms. If in any judicial proceeding, a court shall refuse to enforce any of the separate covenants 
deemed included in this paragraph, the unenforceable covenant shall be deemed eliminated from this 
paragraph for the purpose of that proceeding and to the extent necessary to permit the remaining 
separate covenants (meaning the covenants with respect to the remaining geographical areas) to be 
enforced. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed as restricting Executive's right to own shares 
or other equity interests in any corporation or association provided that Executive does not perform 
services for, or participate in any way in the management of such entity in violation of the provisions 
of this paragraph and that Executive owns 5% or less of the equity of any such business or association. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall survive the termination of this Agreement. 
13. Nondisclosure of Information. Executive acknowledges that he will have access to 
confidential data and information which is of a special and unique value to the Company, including, 
without limitation, the books and records of the Company relating to operations, finances, accounting, 
sales, personnel, and management; technical information related to proprietary rights of the 
Company; information with respect to customer names, addresses, and requirements; price lists; costs 
of operations, services, and products of the Company; and methods of doing business. Executive agrees 
to keep himself fully informed of the policies and procedures established by the Company for 
safeguarding its property and will strictly comply with those policies and procedures at all times. 
Executive agrees he will not, during or after the term of this Agreement, divulge or appropriate to his 
own use or the use of others, or maliciously divulge to any other person, any trade secret, proprietary 
item, or any item designated "Confidential" by the Company, its parents, or subsidiaries. For 
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purposes of this Agreement, the term "trade secret" shall mean any information, process, or procedure 
utilized by the Company, its parents, and subsidiaries which is not public information and which is 
maintained on a confidential basis by the Company, specifically including its methods of pricing, 
biding processes and procedures, supplier lists, supplier agreements, and training procedures. The 
term "proprietary item" shall mean any item of information or data and any processes or procedures 
owned by the Company, its parents, and subsidiaries specifically including its customer lists, methods 
of operation, and special procedures utilized in its operations. Executive agrees that he will not, 
except as authorized by the Company, remove any property belonging to the Company from its place of 
business. Executive hereby covenants and agrees to return all documents, information, and data to 
the Company immediately upon termination of this Agreement. The provisions of this paragraph 
shall survive the termination of this Agreement. 
14. Remedies on Default. If, at any time, Executive breaches, to any material extent, the 
provisions of paragraphs 10,11,12, or 13 hereof, the Company shall have the right to terminate all of 
its obligations to make further payments under the terms of this Agreement. Executive hereby 
specifically acknowledges that monetary damages to the Company for the breach of certain provisions 
hereunder, specifically including the ownership of Discoveries as set forth in paragraph 10, the 
covenants not to compete set forth in paragraphs 11 and 12, and the nondisclosure of information set 
forth in paragraph 13, may be difficult to determine and/or inadequate to compensate the Company for 
a breach thereof, and hereby agrees that in the event of any breach by Executive of such provisions, 
the Company, in addition to any other remedies it may have under the terms of this Agreement or at 
law, shall have the right to bring an action in equity for an injunction against the breach or threatened 
breach of such obligations or seeking specific performance of the obligations of Executive thereunder. 
If the provisions of this paragraph shall survive the termination of this Agreement. 
15. Disability. If Executive is unable to perform his services by reason of illness or 
incapacity for a period of more than 12 consecutive weeks, the compensation thereafter payable to him 
by the Company during the continued period of such illness or incapacity shall be reduced by 50%. 
Executive's full compensation shall be reinstated on his return to full employment and discharge of his 
full duties. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, the Company may terminate this Agreement 
at any time after Executive shall be absent from his employment, for whatever cause, for a continuous 
period of more than six months or for an aggregate of nine months in any 24-month period, and all 
obligations of the Company under the terms of this Agreement shall thereon terminate. 
16. Termination bv the Company. In addition to its rights to terminate this Agreement set 
forth elsewhere herein and notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, this Agreement 
and the Executive's employment may be terminated by the Company on the occurrence of any of the 
following: 
(a) Executive's conduct involving the business affairs of the Company constituting 
common law fraud, conviction of a felony, embezzlement from the Company, or other willful or 
malicious unlawful conduct of a similar nature; 
(b) Any material breach by Executive of the provisions of this Agreement; or 
(c) Executive has been grossly negligent in the performance of his duties, has 
substantially failed to meet reasonable standards established by the Company for the 
performance of his duties, or has engaged in any material willful misconduct in the performance 
of his duties hereunder. 
If this Agreement is terminated by the Company in accordance with the provisions of this 
paragraph 16 or as provided elsewhere in this Agreement, the Company shall have no further 
obligation to make further salary payments to Executive under the terms of this Agreement. 
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17. Death During Employment If Executive dies during the term of this Agreement, the 
Company shall pay to the estate of Executive the compensation that would otherwise be payable to 
Executive up to the end of the month in which his death occurs. 
18. Nontransferability. Neither Executive, his spouse, his designated contingent 
beneficiary, nor their estates shall have any right to anticipate, encumber, or dispose of any payment 
due under this Agreement. Such payments and other rights are expressly declared nonassignable and 
nontransferable except as specifically provided herein. 
19. Indemnification. Except for willful misconduct by Executive, the Company shall 
indemnify Executive and hold him harmless from liability for acts or decisions made by him while 
performing services for the Company if such indemnification is permitted by the Company's certificate 
of incorporation and bylaws, including any future amendments. The Company shall use its best 
efforts to obtain coverage for Executive under any insurance policy now in force or hereinafter 
obtained during the term of this Agreement insuring officers and directors of the Company against 
such liability. 
20. Assignment. This Agreement may not be assigned by either party without the prior 
written consent of the other party. 
21. Stock Options. The Company's parent, Pinnacle Enfironmental, Inc. ("Pinnacle"), shall 
issue to Executive options to purchase common stock under Pinnacle's 1989 Incentive Stock Option 
and Stock Award Plan options to purchase common stock of Pinnacle as follows: 
(a) Pinnacle shall issue to Executive options to purchase an aggregate of 
50,000 shares at any time on or before September 30, 1996, at an exercise price of $2.50 per 
share, the approximate fair market price of Pinnacle common stock as quoted on the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Automated Quotation system ("NASDAQ") as of the date 
hereof; 
(b) Pinnacle shall issue to Executive options to purchase an aggregate of 
50,000 shares of Pinnacle common stock at any time on or before September 30, 1996, at a 
purchase price of $2.50 per share; provided, that options with respect to 25,000 shares shall 
expire on September 30,1992, if at least one repackaging center is not opened and in operation 
by such date, and further provided, that options for an additional 25,000 shares shall expire on 
September 30, 1993, if Pinnacle has not opened and placed in operation one additional 
repackaging center by such date; and 
(c) An option to purchase 5,000 shares of Pinnacle common stock at any time during a 
five-year period at an exercise price .equivalent to the bid price of the Pinnacle common stock in 
the over-the-counter market as of the date of grant, for every repackaging center opened prior 
to September 30,1996, issuable on the date of such opening. 
All options shall be subject to the terms and conditions of the incentive stock option plan and the 
related form of option that is attached to such plan. 
22. Entire Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties 
with respect to any written or oral negotiations, commitments, and understandings. No letter, 
telegram, or other communication passing between the parties hereto shall be deemed a part of this 
Agreement; nor shall a subsequent communication have the effect of modifying or adding to this 
Agreement unless it is distinctly stated in such letter, telegram, or other communication that it is to 
constitute a part of this Agreement and is signed by the parties to this Agreement. 
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23. Counterparts and Headings. This Agreement may be executed in two or more 
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original and all of which together shall constitute one 
and the same instrument. All headings in this Agreement are inserted for convenience or reference 
and shall not affect the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement. 
24. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance 
with the laws of the state of Utah. 
25. Arbitration. In the event of a dispute or controversy between the parties as to the 
provisions or performance of this Agreement, such dispute or controversy shall be submitted to 
arbitration in accordance with the rules and procedures of the American Arbitration Association. The 
Company and Executive shall each bear 50% of the third party costs of such arbitration. 
26. Severability. If and to the extent that any court of competent jurisdiction holds any 
provision, or any part thereof, of this Agreement to be invalid or unenforceable, such holding shall in 
no way affect the validity of the remainder of this Agreement. 
27. Waiver. No failure by any party to insist upon the strict performance of any covenant, 
duty, agreement, or condition of this Agreement or to exercise any right or remedy consequent upon a 
breach hereof shall constitute a waiver of any such breach, any subsequent breach of the same 
obligation, or of any other covenant, agreement, term, or condition. 
28. Litigation Expenses. If any action, suit, or proceeding is brought by a party with respect 
to a matter or matters governed by this Agreement, all costs and expenses of the prevailing party 
incurred in connection with such proceeding, including reasonable attorneys' fees, shall be paid by the 
nonprevailing party. 
AGREED AND ENTERED INTO as of the date first above written. 
THE COMPANY: ENVIRO PAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC. 





THIS ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT (this "Agreement-) is entered into this 19th day of 
September, 1991, by and between FREDERICK NINOW, an individual ("Ninow"), ENVIRO PAK 
MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC. (the "Company"), a Utah corporation, and PINNACLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., a Delaware corporation, and sole shareholder of the Company ("Pinnacle") 
on the following: 
Premises 
Ninow has developed a business plan to package, market, and service prepackaged medical 
supplies for various health care procedures and desires to participate in the organization of a business 
enterprise to implement such business plan. The Company has or can obtain financial, managerial, 
and other resources that it can provide to such enterprise. Pinnacle, as the sole shareholders of the 
Company desires to provide certain incentives to Ninow and other persons associated with the 
Company. Therefore, the parties desire to join together in organizing a business and operation to 
implement the business plan developed by Ninow. 
Agreement 
NOW, THEREFORE, upon these premises which are incorporated herein by reference, and for 
and in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set forth herein, it is hereby agreed as 
follows: 
1. Organization of Company. Immediately preceding the execution of this Agreement, the 
Company has been organized as a Utah corporation with articles of incorporation in the form attached 
hereto as exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. As set forth in such articles of incorporation, 
the sole incorporator and initial director of the Company is Todd B. Crosland. The Company will elect 
the following persons as officers and directors: 
Frederick N inow Director, Chairman, and President 
Rockwell D. Schutjer Director and Vice-President 
Todd B. Crosland Director and Secretary/Treasurer 
2. Assignment of Business Plan. Ninow hereby assigns, conveys, and sets over unto the 
Company all of Ninow's right, title, and interest in and to a business plan, procedure, method of 
practice, and related know-how, information, business contacts, relationships, and other information 
relating to the initiation and operation of a business enterprise to market to hospitals and other health 
care providers prepackaged supply packets containing materials frequently used in surgical and other 
health care procedures, featuring principal components that are laundered, sterilized, and repackaged 
for repeated use, rather than disposed of, all as more particularly described in the materials attached 
hereto as exhibit B and incorporated herein by reference (the "Business Plan"). 
3. Autonomous Operation. During the term hereof, the Company shall have its own 
management, budget, physical facilities, and accounting books and records so as to retain its separate 
identity from Pinnacle and its other subsidiaries. During such period, Pinnacle shall cause the board 
of directors of the Company to consist of four persons, one of whom shall be Ninow, one of whom shall 
be a person designated by Ninow, and two of them shall be designees of Pinnacle. 
4. Financial Support. The Company shall utilize its best efforts to obtain such capital, 
credit enhancement, and other financing as it may reasonably require to acquire, open, and place in 
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operation individual repackaging centers serving appropriate market territories to provide the 
services generally described in the Business Plan at the cost for capital expenditures, startup 
expenses, and related expenditures as more particular described therein, subject to the achievement of 
financial performance for centers previously placed in operation generally consist with the results of 
operations forecast in such Business Plan. 
5. Employment Agreement. Contemporaneously with the execution of this Agreement, the 
Company shall enter into an executive employment agreement with Ninow. 
6. Stock Options for Other Key Employees. As the Company assembles its management 
team of key executives during the next year, Pinnacle shall grant and issue to such key executives as 
the Company may determine,when they become associated with the Company, options to purchase an 
aggregate of 100,000 shares of common stock of the Company under and subject to the terms and 
conditions of Pinnacle's 1989 Stock Option and Stock Award Plan. 
7. Incentive Compensation. The Company shall create a cash incentive compensation pool 
based on the Company's pre-tax profits as a percentage of revenues, to be divided among the various 
members of the executive management group of the Company, in such manner as the board of 
directors of the Company may determine. The amount to be allocated to such incentive compensation 
pool and to be allocated among and paid to such executives shall be determined as follows: 
Percent of Pre-Tax 
Pre-Tax Profits as a Profits AUocated 
Percentage of Gross Revenues to Compensation Pool 
15%, but less than 20% 1% 
20%, but less than 25% 2% 
25%, but less than 30% 3% 
30%, but less than 35% 4% 
35% or more 5% 
Revenues shall include all revenues from the sale of products or services by the Company, net of 
returns and adjustments, and including extraordinary items. Pre-tax profits shall include all profits 
from whatever source, including extraordinary items, prior to payment of or allowance for income 
taxes. Such incentive compensation shall be determined and paid annually, in any event within 
110 days after the end of the fiscal year. To the extent practicable, prior to the end of the fiscal year 
the Company shall review its estimated earnings and profits for the year, shall estimate the amount 
allocable to such incentive compensation pool, shall allocate such pool among the various members of 
the executive management team, and shall pay such estimated amounts, with final adjustments and 
reconciliations to be made within 110 days after the end of such year. By way of example, if in a given 
fiscal year the Company had gross revenues of $10,000,000 that result in pre-tax profits of $2,300,000, 
which is 23% of such revenues, then 2% of such $2,300,000 of pre-tax profits, or $46,000, would be 
allocated to such incentive compensation pool. 
8, Standard Textiles Products. The parties shall cooperate and utilize their best efforts to 
obtain from Standard Textiles such reasonable assurances as Pinnacle and the Company may deem 
adequate respecting the recognition of the conveyance by Ninow to the Company of the Business Plan 
described herein, the initiation of such business by the Company, and the grant to the Company of an 
exclusive marketing territory for selected markets for certain products. 
9. Indemnification 
(a) Pinnacle hereby agrees to indemnify the Company, its executive officers and 
directors, against any and all Pinnacle liabilities, obligations, claims for relief, and other losses 
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or damages that the Company or its executive officers or directors may suffer or incur as a result 
of any action or failure to act by Pinnacle. 
(b) The Company hereby agrees to indemnify Pinnacle, its executive officers and 
directors, against any and all Company liabilities, obligations, claims for relief, and other losses 
or damages that Pinnacle or its executive officers or directors may suffer or incur as a result of 
any action or failure to act by the Company. 
10. Term. This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect through September 30,1996. 
11. Notice of Default. No party shall exercise any right or remedy on the alleged default of 
the other party unless such party shall have failed to remedy such alleged default within 30 days after 
notice thereof from the nondefaulting party. 
12. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with 
the laws of the state of Utah. 
13. Notices. All notices, demands, requests, or other communications required or authorized 
hereunder shall be deemed given sufficiently if in writing and if personally delivered; if sent by 
facsimile transmission, confirmed with a written copy thereof sent by overnight express delivery; if 
sent by registered mail or certified mail, return receipt requested and postage prepaid; or if sent by 
overnight express delivery: 
If to the Company, to: EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc. 
Attn: Todd B. Crosland 
774 South 500 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Facsimile No.: (801)359-7755 
If to Ninow, to: Mr. Frederick Ninow 
7490 South Bekkemellom Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
or such other addresses and facsimile numbers as shall be furnished in writing by any party in the 
manner for giving notices hereunder, and any such notice, demand, request, or other communication 
shall be deemed to have been given as of the date so delivered or sent by facsimile transmission, three 
days after the date so mailed, or one day after the date so sent by overnight delivery. 
14. Attorneys' Fees. In the event that any party institutes any action or suit to enforce this 
Agreement or to secure relief from any default hereunder or breach hereof, the breaching party or 
parties shall reimburse the nonbreaching party or parties for all costs, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees, incurred in connection therewith and in enforcing or collecting any judgment rendered therein. 
15. Specific Performance. The parties acknowledge that the rights in this Agreement are 
extraordinary and unique, 4nd that remedies at law may be inadequate to compensate the parties for 
the breach or threatened breach of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. The parties consent to 
the granting of equitable relief, including specific performance or injunction, whether temporary, 
preliminary, or final, in favor of the other party without proof of actual damages. 
16. Survival: Termination. The representations, warranties, and covenants of the respective 
parties shall survive the closing date and the consummation of the transactions herein contemplated. 
17. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which 
shall be deemed an original and all of which taken together shall be but a single instrument. 
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18. No Assignment. This Agreement cannot be assigned in whole or in part by one of the 
parties without the prior written consent of all other parties. 
DATED as of the year and date first above written. 
Frederick Ninow 
ENV1RO PAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC. 
d B. Crosland, President 
PINNACLE ENVIRONMENTAL, INC. 
Rv y\ ^f ^~--f^*-T*r<2 
Rex Crd&land, President 
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RE PA CK 
MANAGEMENT AND KEY PERSONNEL 
Top management and key personnel consists of the following 
ceopie, each of which brings a unique competence to the 
management group of Repack Surgical Products. 
President / CEO 
Richard J. Hollingshead 
Chief Financial Officer / Secretary 
John Hales 
Vice President / Marketing 
Frederick Ninow 
Vice President / Production and Materials Mgmt, 
Joe Murray 
Director / Operations 
John Diston 
Director / Inservice 
Susan Kay Van Houten B.S.N, M.B.A. 
Director / Research and Development 
Jeff Taylor ^ -.^  
Director / Facilities Development 
Hal M. Magleby A ^ e.'-/V'*-^ ' 
Consultant 
Dr. Jerry Rees Nelson ^c *^ v ^ ,;^ 
Consultant 
Don McKelvie Lj^^^ry, 
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LETTER OF INTENT 
TO ENTER EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS LETTER OF INTENT TO ENTER INTO AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
:his "Letter of intent") dated September 20, 1991, by and between 
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS INC., a corporation organized and 
)existing under the state of Utah (the "Company") and ROCHELLE MILLS 
("Employee"). 
1. INTENT. The Company intends to enter into an employment 
agreement with Employee on or before October 31, 1991. 
2. Term. The initial term of the employment agreement shall 
be for three years. 
3. Compensation. 
(a) For all services rendered by Employee, the Company 
shall pay a salary of $50,000 per year payable as earned in 
twenty-four (24) equal semi-monthly payments. All salary 
shall be subject to withholdings and other applicable taxes. 
Such salary shall be reviewed annually and shall remain fixed 
or be increased to the extent deemed appropriate by the board 
of directors of the Company. 
(b) As an incentive compensation, Employee shall 
participate in the Company,s cash incentive compensation pool. 
(c) The Company shall provide health and medical 
insurance to be chosen by the Company for its full time 
employees. 
(d) The Company shall provide Employee a 
automobile. 
COMPANY 
(e) The Company s h a l l p r o v i d e Employee wi th s tock 
f p t r i o n . q a s i n r p r ^ . i v f r t o e n t e r i n t o a n Empl p y r ^ n f Agreement 
with the Company. The Company shall also provide Employee with 
future stock options as part of the Company incentive program. 
These options will be determined by the company at the time of 
employment. 
(f) The Company will pay for actual and reasonable 
expenses incurred by Employee in connection with the business 
of the company, including expenses for entertainment, travel 
and similar items. 
it^ re 
(g) The Employee shall be entitled each year to a paid 
vacation of at least two (2) weeks. 
LETTER OF INTENT as of the date first above written. 
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC. 
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CERTIFIED COPY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 





ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS 





Civil No. 92 090 2269 CN 
Deposition of: 
Rochelle Mills-LaRocca 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
TRACI L. RAMIREZ, RPR, CSR, NP 
Associated Professional Reporters 
10 West Broadway / Suite 200 / Salt Lake City Utah 84101 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of July, 1993, 
the deposition of Rochelle Mills-LaRocca, produced as a 
witness herein at the instance of the defendants herein, 
in the above-entitled action now pending in the above-
named court, was taken before Traci L. Ramirez, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
commencing at the hour of 2:25 p.m. of said day, at the 
offices of Kruse, Landa & Maycock, Eighth Floor, Bank One 
Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to notice. 
-000-
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the P l a i n t i f f : 
For t h e Defendants: 
A l s o Presen t : 
Neil R. Sabin 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys at Law 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ellen Maycock 
David C. Wright 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Attorneys at Law 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John Diston 
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I N D E X 
Witness 
Rochelle Mills-LaRocca 
Examination by Ms. Maycock 
Examination by Mr. Sabin 
Further Examination by Ms. Maycock 
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E X H I B I T S 
Description 
Company Overview 






























1 Saturday, when you met with Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston 
2 about EnviroPak? 
3 A EnviroPak actually wasn't even — I knew it as 
4 Pinnacle. He had become involved with Pinnacle, and he 
5 was very excited. And he said that we would be coming to 
6 work for him and, hopefully, that we would get to meet the 
7 key players there in a relative amount of time. 
8 Q So as of September 20th, 1991, had you met 
9 anybody from Pinnacle? 
10 A Uh-uh (negative). 
11 Q Had you dealt with anybody on behalf of 
12 EnviroPak or Pinnacle other than Fred Ninow? 
13 A Not yet, no. 
14 Q Okay. When you say you talked about salary and 
15 how long your employment contract would be, and so on, you 
16 had only talked to Fred Ninow about that? 
17 A Originally, yeah. 
18 Q As of the time he gave you this, he's the only 
19 person you talked to? 
20 A Right. 
21 Q Did he show you anything else, at that point? 
22 A He showed me his contract that told us that he 
2 3 had the authority to be giving me a letter of intent. 
24 (Whereupon, marked Deposition Exhibit 3 for 
25 identification.) 
12 
can't ask John these answers, can I? 
Q No. We know what he thinks. We want your 
memory. 
A Okay. 
Q If it might help, I think there were some trials 
of the products that Mr. Ninow was selling in the spring 
of 1991. Is that when you met him? 
A Right. I met him through the hospital, working 
with him on the trials. 
Q Did there come a time when you began to talk to 
Mr. Ninow about going to work with him, or for him, or for 
a company he was associated with? 
A Yes. 
Q When did you begin to talk to him about that? 
A I think it was about a month after I met him. 
He came to me and asked if I would be interested — 
because I was so interested in the product, if I might be 
interested in working for him. And I said that I would 
be. 
Q At that time, who would you have been working 
for, a particular company? 
A He was trying to get this business together, and 
I guess it would have been him. He was affiliated with a 
company called Professional Medical before he became 
affiliated with Pinnacle. So I was just interested in 
6 
1 working with the product. There was a lot of change and a 
2 lot of stuff going on as far as — I didn't really know 
3 who I would be working for. 
4 Q We should probably clarify for the record what 
5 product we7re talking about. 
6 A Reusable products, reusable surgical products: 
7 gowns, drapes, things of that nature. 
8 Q As I understand it, the thing that was different 
9 from what you had been doing in the operating room at Holy 
10 Cross was that the surgical gowns, and so on, had been 
11 disposable. 
12 A Right. 
13 Q And these products that Mr. Ninow was working 
14 with were taken out and sterilized and laundered and used 
15 again? 
16 A Exactly. It was the whole process. 
17 Q Okay. When you first began to talk to Mr. Ninow 
18 about employment, did you talk about how much money you 
19 would make, what your job would be? 
20 A We talked about what the job would be. He said 
21 there was going to be some changes happening within the 
22 company, and he may be starting another company. And so I 
2 3 was real interested on what those changes would be. We 
24 had originally gotten together with some other people to 
2 5 talk about doing it on our own, but it looked like a 
1 Exhibit 2 a document that's entitled "Letter of Intent to 
2 Enter Employment Agreement." That's one of the documents 
3 you brought with you today, is it not? 
4 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
5 Q Tell me how you got ahold of that document to 
6 begin with. 
7 A Actually, I got this document at the same time 
8 that John got his. We met with Fred on a Saturday 
9 afternoon. He brought it out and filled it out in front 
10 of us, and signed it. 
11 MR. SABIN: Do you have a copy? 
12 MR. WRIGHT: Did you get all of the pages? 
13 There's writing on the back. 
14 THE WITNESS: Oh, but that was another 
15 conversation. 
16 Q (By MS. MAYCOCK) We've got a meeting with you, 
17 Fred Ninow, and John Diston — 
18 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
19 Q — on a Saturday afternoon? 
20 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
21 Q Can you give me an approximate date? 
22 A It was the date that this was signed. I'm sure 
23 September 20th is a Saturday, if we looked back for '91. 
24 Q Where were you? 
25 A We were at John Diston's house. 
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1 Q You said, I think, that Fred Ninow filled it 
2 out. 
3 A Well, he had to obviously do this. We said that 
4 we wanted something from him to see that he was serious 
5 about a job possibility. 
6 Q So did he prepare it right there that day? 
7 A No. He had this with him. We had told him what 
8 we had talked about. I had told him what I had talked 
9 about. And then I don't know when he did this. But he 
10 had this with him that day, and he filled it out for us, 
11 basically just by signing. 
12 Q When you say you had toid him what you had 
13 talked about, tell me what you mean by that. 
14 A Well, I had talked about a three-year 
15 compensation, salary rates, things like that. 
16 Q With Mr. Ninow? 
17 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
18 Q So there had been some discussions between you 
19 and Mr. Ninow prior to this Saturday meeting? 
20 A A lot of discussions. 
21 Q About you going to work for EnviroPak? 
22 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
2 3 Q Or some company? 
24 A Yeah, with the reusables. 
25 Q Okay. What did you know on that day, that 
11 
1 Saturday, when you met with Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston 
2 about EnviroPak? 
3 A EnviroPak actually wasn't even — I knew it as 
4 Pinnacle. He had become involved with Pinnacle, and he 
5 was very excited. And he said that we would be coming to 
6 work for him and, hopefully, that we would get to meet the 
7 key players there in a relative amount of time. 
8 Q So as of September 20th, 1991, had you met 
9 anybody from Pinnacle? 
10 A Uh-uh (negative). 
11 Q Had you dealt with anybody on behalf of 
12 EnviroPak or Pinnacle other than Fred Ninow? 
13 A Not yet, no. 
14 Q Okay. When you say you talked about salary and 
15 how long your employment contract would be, and so on, you 
16 had only talked to Fred Ninow about that? 
17 A Originally, yeah. 
18 Q As of the time he gave you this, he's the only 
19 person you talked to? 
2 0 A Right. 
21 Q Did he show you anything else, at that point? 
22 A He showed me his contract that told us that he 
23 had the authority to be giving me a letter of intent. 
24 (Whereupon, marked Deposition Exhibit 3 for 
25 identification.) 
12 
A Yeah. I mean, I didn 




I remember his salary. 




you in your meeting on September 




Okay. The Exhibit 2 
the "Letter of Intent to Enter 
assume when Fred Ninow gave it 




No, it didn't. 
Did you write that at 
"? 
that we'1 
it from cover to 
is the one, 
you think what he 
20th is the 
ve talked about, 
Employment Agreement," I 
to you, 
a later 
I wrote this at a later time 
to decide if it was something -- I have 
it didn't have any 
time? 
when I was trying 
a consultant that 
I work with when I'm going to be making major life 
changes, and he was who I talked with on the phone. So I 
just wrote on there — 
Q You mean before you decided whether you wanted 
to go to work for EnviroPak, you talked to a consultant? 
A Yeah. 
Q That's when you made your notes? 
A Right. It was in the evening. I can't even 
remember when. 
Q Give me a time frame. Within a few days after 
14 
1 A I met Rock and I met Todd and I met Rex. Those 
2 are the ones that I remember most vividly. And some of 
3 the stockholders. 
4 Q What did you do at the meeting? 
5 A I sat up at the front. There was like a table 
6 at the front, and I sat up there. And when it came 
7 time — they had a question and answer period, and I 
8 answered questions about my experience with the product. 
9 And I also opened up a disposable pack and a reusable pack 
10 so they could see the difference of how much waste you 
11 would have with the disposable versus a reusable. 
12 Q How were you introduced? 
13 A Gosh, I feel like I should have just written 
14 every single thing down. 
15 Q Well, none of us do that. 
16 A I think I was introduced as Rochelle Mills, 
17 minor surgery coordinator of Holy Cross Hospital. 
18 Q Was John Diston also there? 
19 A Yes, he was. 
2 0 Q How was he introduced? 
21 A Probably — I would have to say he was probably 
22 introduced as the assistant director of the operating 
23 room, I think. 




Q Not from EnviroPak? 
A Oh, no. 
Q At that time, did you talk to Todd Crosland or 
Rock Schutjer or Rex Crosland about working for EnviroPak? 
A No. It wouldn't have been appropriate, at that 
time. There was no privacy. It was too busy. 
Q When was the first time that you talked to any 
of those people about working for EnviroPak? 
A It was after I had given my notice, and Fred 
called me up and said, You need to meet with more key 
players. So that's when I met with them. 
Q You went to their offices? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Who did you meet with? 
A I met Todd and I met Rock. 
Q Was Fred in the meeting also? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q What did you talk about? Let me ask you, first, 
if you can give me a date. 
A Oh, gosh. I can't. What was talked about was 
they said that they wanted me to come to work for them. 
And it was during that meeting I realized that Fred might 
not have as much power as he had alluded to. Because they 
never saw this, this agreement. And we talked money, and 
21 
we talked about the possibility of coming to work for 
them. And we set a date, 
Q Okay. When you say "they never saw this," is 
that something they said in the meeting, that they had not 
seen your letter of intent that's Exhibit 2? 
A No. It was just that when I went into the 
meeting, it became apparent that Fred didn't have quite as 
much power as he said he did. And so I didn't think it 
would be in my best interest to mention this at the time. 
So I didn't. 
Q So it wasn't talked about? 
A It wasn't talked about. And they offered me a 
job. So I felt like I was okay, thus writing all over 
this. Obviously, if I thought it was an important 
document, I probably wouldn't have. 
Q Well, the handwriting, had you done that before 
or after you met with Todd and Rock? 
A I think this was before I met with them. 
Q Because you just said something about, you 
wouldn't have written all over it if you thought it was 
important. 
A Well, yeah. Because after I met with them and 
they did a letter of intent, or whatever you want to call 
it that you see attached there, that's what they did. So 
I thought, Well, I've got that. And this was laying on 
22 
the counter when I was taking some notes on the telephone. 
Q So it got to be the note pad? 
A That's right. Everything that's close to me, I 
grab. 
Q That's what happens in my house. 
MS. MAYCOCK: Let's mark this. 
(Whereupon, marked Deposition Exhibit 4 for 
identification.) 
Q (By MS. MAYCOCK) We've marked as Deposition 
Exhibit 4 a document that's entitled "Employment Proposal 
for Rochelle Mills," and it's signed by Todd Crosland. Is 
that what came out of your meeting with Todd Crosland and 
Rock Schutjer and Fred Ninow? 
A Right. 
Q Were there differences between that employment 
proposal and the terms that were on the letter of intent? 
A There were. The original letter of intent was 
for three years, and they were not willing to do that. 
They only wanted to go for one year. 
Q What else? 
A I think other than that, it was basically the 
same. They paid for expenses, automobile. Oh, no. I did 
not get stock options, and I originally talked about stock 
options with Fred. So I didn't receive any stock options. 
And we had originally talked about what you would make the 
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1 first year, what you would make the second year, and what 
2 you'd make the third year, and that is not in the — 
3 actually, it's not in either of them. 
4 Q But you had discussed with Fred Ninow that you 
5 would have annual increases, or something like that? 
6 A Right, yeah, if everything went the way we 
7 wanted it to, 
8 Q The other difference that would seem to me to 
9 exist is, Exhibit 4 has a job description, and the letter 
10 of intent, Exhibit 2, doesn't describe what your duties 
11 were or what your title would be. 
12 A That's true. 
13 Q When did you begin to work for EnviroPak? 
14 A I think that it was October 24th. The same day 
15 that I quit Holy, I went to work for EnviroPak. I worked 
16 a half a morning at Holy, and then I worked at EnviroPak. 
17 Q No days off, huh? 
18 A No, I didn't take any time off. 
19 Q After you met with Todd and Rock and Fred Ninow, 
2 0 and I think you said you found that Fred Ninow didn't have 
21 as much power to do things as you had previously thought, 
22 did you report that to John Diston? 
23 A What I said to John was that it didn't go the 
24 way that I had originally thought that it would go. 
25 Because Fred had talked money with me. But then when push 
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1 came to shove, it was actually Rock who was the one that 
2 discussed money. I told John after my meeting that it 
3 didn't go exactly the way I wanted, but that I was hired. 
4 Q How soon after the meeting did you tell this to 
5 John? 
6 A Well, the meeting was during my workday. So I 
7 left work to go to the meeting, and came back and saw him 
8 later. 
9 Q So that very same day? 
10 A Yeah. 
11 Q Did you tell him something to the effect that, 
12 Fred Ninow wasn't the sole decisionmaker about these 
13 issues of salary and terms of employment? 
14 A I can't really remember exactly what I said. I 
15 think I just told him that the meeting didn't go exactly 
16 as I had planned, but that I was hired. 
17 Q Did you give him any advice about his future 
18 employment? 
19 A Not really. I knew that he was hoping to come 
20 to work for them. But when I had the interview, even 
21 though John and I had worked really closely together and 
22 we were with Fred, we weren't really being hired as a 
23 team. So, obviously, I didn't bring his name up when I 
24 was interviewing for myself. 
25 Q Did you tell John that the terms you got hired 
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1 on were different from those in the letter of intent? 
2 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
3 Q You told him that that same day? 
4 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
5 Q We're thinking this meeting is the second or 
6 third week of October? 
7 A Yeah. 
8 Q Is Exhibit 4 the only written agreement that you 
9 had with EnviroPak about your employment? 
10 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
11 Q Please say yes or no. It's easier for the court 
12 reporter. 
13 A I'm sorry. I've never done this before. 
14 Q Sometimes those uh-huhs and uh-uhs — 
15 A I keep wondering what she's doing on there. 
16 Q Let me ask you a couple of other things. 
17 (Whereupon, marked Deposition Exhibit 5 for 
18 identification.) 
19 Q (By MS. MAYCOCK) What we've marked as 
20 Deposition Exhibit 5 is another document you brought with 
21 you today. 
22 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
23 Q It seems to be a letter dated January 9, 1992, 
24 to a mortgage company. Was this verification of 
25 employment, that kind of thing? 
26 
1 A Oh, yeah. They were all — they were great to 
2 work for. 
3 Q Other than that meeting we've talked about at 
4 Little America with Pinnacle shareholders, and so on, did 
5 you attend any meetings with stockholders, anything else 
6 like that? 
7 A You mean just like that one? 
8 Q Or kind of like that one. 
9 A I attended — I think it was one or two stock 
10 meetings, but I wasn't — I was just there as an observer, 
11 because I had some stock in the company. 
12 Q You were more audience than show? 
13 A Yeah. I only really did it one time. 
14 Q And that was the one at Little America? 
15 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
16 Q Do you think you ever saw the "Organization 
17 Agreement" that we marked as Exhibit 3, before today? 
18 A I don't think it was this one. Because the one 
19 that I vividly recall seeing was on my way down to Las 
20 Vegas, and that was what he had made that had the $100,000 
21 a year. 
22 Q Now I'm confused. The "Executive Employment 
23 Agreement"? 
24 A Yeah. 
2 5 Q You think you saw that on the way to Las Vegas? 
31 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
S t a t e of U t a h ) 
County of Salt Lake) 
This is to certify that the deposition of Rochelle 
Mills-LaRocca, the witness in the foregoing deposition 
named, was taken before me, Traci L. Ramirez, a Certified 
Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, residing at 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
That the said witness was by me, before examination, 
duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth in said cause. 
That the testimony of said witness was reported by me 
in stenotype, and thereafter caused by me to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that a full, true, and 
correct transcription of said testimony so taken and 
transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 
from 4 to 73, inclusive, and said witness deposed and said 
as in the foregoing annexed deposition. 
I further certify that after the said deposition was 
transcribed, the original of same was delivered to Ellen 
Maycock, attorney for the defendants, to be submitted to 
the witness for reading and signature, signed before a 
notary public and returned to me for filing with the clerk 
of said court. 
I further certify that I am not a kin or otherwise 
associated with any of the parties to said cause of 
action, and that I am not interested in the event thereof. 
Witness my hand and officiaj. seal at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 13th day of July, 19J 
My commission expires: 
October 14, 1995 
T r a c i L. R a m i r e z , RPR, CSKrf NP 
TOACILRAMREZ 
mAftYPVGUC-SJXIEofUnH 
&JW. 2100 NORTH 
JARION, UT $403* 
00*5*2. EXPIRES 10-14*5 
75 
